The Military Geniuses of the Punic Wars

When first given this book to review, I thought that Plutarch and his compelling series of associated Greek and Roman biographies was the inspiration for its treatment. Although the author also had Plutarch in mind, his chief inspiration was Alan Bullock’s comprehensive historical tome, Hitler and Stalin.

Hornblower has picked a compelling pair of military geniuses to compare. First of all, they were contemporaries who competed directly, who met as brilliant equals in battle, and who even spoke to one another, unlike any of Plutarch’s subjects.

This dramatic clash of champions has been narrated many times, most memorably by Polybius and Livy. Nevertheless, the author shapes his biographical contrast into a gripping interwoven chronicle that deepens understanding of the two men’s choices.

Reality Fragments. A distinguished classical historian, with 25 books under his belt, Simon Hornblower has served as Professor of Classics and Grote Professor of Ancient History at University College, London. He is a proven, careful scholar; the reader is fortunate that the professor is also a smooth, clear writer.

The difficulties of ferreting reality from sparse, contradictory, or prejudiced sources especially plague every pre-print historian. Of course, the subjects of the book were far too busy to scribble memoirs. Consequently, the author diligently sifts through numerous sources, the vast majority of which were written by Roman and Greek historians years after the relevant events.

Of course, a range of similarities between the Carthaginian and the Roman are a given, as Hornblower recognizes. Born a decade apart into upper-class military families, they received appropriate educations for their status. Both were powerfully influenced by their fathers, both of whomfell in battle, vowing revenge upon respective enemies in their sires’ names. They became general officers rather young. Each commanded major armies in distant, hostile lands, with great independence and success.

Character and the Cards Dealt. For our audience, Hornblower’s most fascinating chapter would be the 16th: “Hannibal and Scipio: The Military Comparisons.” He focuses on the following factors that highlight similar choices and competencies: The Creation of a New Sort of Army (for both); Logistics; Weaponry; Battle Tactics; Punic Deception…or Roman; Other Sorts of Fighting; The Political Dimension…Hearts and Minds; Man Management; and, of course, like every chapter, it has a conclusion. (An unusual feature, but welcome.) Here Hornblower states--

“In terms of battle tactics alone, there is no doubt that Hannibal was the teacher and Scipio the pupil. Without Cannae [Hannibal’s obliteration of Rome’s strongest army], there would have been no Baecula and Ilipa [Scipio's victories in Spain over lesser Carthaginian generals]. But as all teachers know, the able pupil can outclass and outstrip the teacher, and that in the end is what happened at Zama.”

But is it that simple? Plutarch believed that character shaped destiny, but most historians today would also assume that major structural issues -- such as socio-economic or political factors -- exist beyond individual control. Hornblower makes it clear that the Carthaginian senate gave Hannibal far less military support than Scipio (and his fellow generals) received. This lack meant constant testing of the older leader’s logistical creativity.

In addition, the Roman navy’s power grew during the Second Punic War, frustrating even infrequent reinforcement by sea. Consequently, Hannibal also struggled to maintain his manpower levels, as well as to supply those he had. Scipio had far fewer worries in that regard. Rome had absorbed most of central and southern Italy, which was the most populated region in the Western Med. Such demographic strength allowed them to withstand staggering losses (like at Cannae) and still field fresh armies.

Show Down: The first and final contest between the two leaders took place at the Battle of Zama, fought in 202 BC, about 60 miles from Carthage. Each general was an excellent military manager and tactician, Hornblower explains. He points out, however, that the armies were not equally balanced. Hannibal did not consider his50,000-man assemblage ready, but his city’s government wanted action.

This force comprised infantry, cavalry, and 80 elephants, but it was neither as cohesive or as disciplined as Scipio’s 35,000 troops. Only the third Carthaginian line, made up of 20,000 crack Italian-campaign vets, could be considered as dependable and as well-drilled as the legionaries they faced. Inexperienced city volunteers and local levies formed the second rank. It would be inaccurate to call the first line of 12,000 Celtic mercenaries untested; nevertheless, they couldn't match the tight coordination of the Roman maniples.

Hannibal had won his most important battles in Italy by a masterful use of horsemen. Before Zama, however, Scipio had applied his political skills well, cultivating the young, ambitious Numidian prince, Masinissa, who competed for his people's support against the older Syphax. After years of diplomatic wooing before the battle, Scipio finally won over Masinissa, who brought 4,000 of his superlative light cavalry to his ally’s side, supplementing the 2,000 mounted Romans.

Hannibal could only muster 2,000 of Syphax’s leftovers and 2,000 Carthaginians. Undoubtedly, he realized that he did not have this vital mobile element to rely on; consequently, the general had to place hope on the shock value of his massed war elephants. (He had not actually used them much in Italy.) Nevertheless, the ruling oligarchs had great faith in the brutes’ battle power , and they had spent lavishly to get this herd together.

Panicky Pahyderms. Alas, the skittish elephants bolted at the first blasts of the battle horns, scattering the Carthaginian cavalry or lumbering off to the right. The few that moved toward the enemy met with Scipio’s careful preparations for their arrival. The Romans had dealt with the huge creatures before, so their commander took advantage of his well-drilled, flexible maniples by opening wide lanes through the ranks to the rear. Yelling, spear-tossing skirmishers ahead of the front coerced the few unpanicked giants toward these gaps. After the elephants passed, the infantry re-established ranks; meanwhile, more light troops waited in the rear to neutralize the bellowing beasts.

Hannibal’s outnumbered cavalry attempted to rally after the elephant stampede, but they were soon hit hard by their more numerous opponents, who chased them off the field. The Roman infantry slowly cut its way through the mercenaries, who were still disorganized from the routing pachyderms. Casualties were heavy. The raw troops of the second line did not last as long. They broke, and tried to flee through the final array. Those veterans refused to disrupt their formation, closing ranks against the scrambling survivors, so many more were slain.

When the legionaries reached Hannibal's grognards, the fighting grew fierce. Mid-battle, Scipio had merged his hastati and princepes (again a testament to their cohesion), thus consolidating them into a single extended front. This was done to match the veteran ranks that Hannibal had already elongated, both to frustrate cavalry encirclement and then to outflank his opponent.

Hornblower describes the fighting between these two contingents as “long, bloody, and desperate.” It would have gone on even longer if the returning Roman/Numidian troopers had not charged into the Carthaginian rear. This assault proved too much, and the third rank unraveled. For the first time in his career, Hannibal had to hightail it from a lost fray.

Interwoven Lines. By design, Hornblower cannot offer the reader a straightforward narrative. His chapters proceed methodically and chronologically; of necessity, the author shifts focus back and forth between the lives of his two subjects, which makes the book a choppy read. Nevertheless, the result is a comprehensive study and detailed analysis -- one that is still captivating.

The professor then traces the lesser-known, but still fascinating, careers of Hannibal and Scipio Africanus in the years after their climactic encounter at Zama. He continues to highlight parallels until their deaths, which coincidentally occurred in the same year -- 183 BC.

Both were skilled politicians. Ironically, their efforts helped Carthage recover faster, which sealed its doom. Scipio managed this through his relatively lenient peace terms, and Hannibal accomplished it through his tax collection reforms and battles against corruption. (The city’s resurgence triggered Roman paranoia, and the subsequent war destroyed Carthage.)

They both went on to be involved in the Republic's great war against the Seleucid king Antiochus III: Hannibal as Antiochus’ military advisor; Scipio as counselor to his brother, who commanded Rome’s army. Antiochus III was also the excuse that jealous elites used to tarnish the reputations of the retired generals. Hannibal was accused of plotting with the Eastern king and had to flee Carthage in 195 BC; Scipio Africanus was the victim of a smear that he had embezzled Seleucid war spoils. Disillusioned, he withdrew into self-imposed exile.

Choppy but Satisfying. In sum, Hornblower’s work does not flow quite as smoothly as stand-alone biographies; it is a bit more challenging to follow. Still, the book’s fine-grained analysis is quite satisfying in its own way. Moreover, the writer’s dual treatment of these personalities manages to open the lens, widening the reader’s perspective. I learned more about the dimensions of the great rivals’ restrictions, decision-making, similarities, and differences than ever before. Besides dispelling many myths that have encrusted their fame, Hornblower succeeds in highlighting the humanity of these unique ancient warriors.

The professor supplies plenty of footnotes (conveniently located on every page, not in a lump after the text), as well as a 29-page bibliography. I wouldn’t mind more detailed maps, but I almost always grouse about that. If you have not yet guessed, I thoroughly recommend Simon Hornblower’s volume to our gentle readers.

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Our Reviewer: A former naval officer, Richard Jupa was a senior finance editor at a major credit rating agency for more than two decades. He is also the co-author of Gulf Wars, on the 1991-1992 Gulf War, and has published over a dozen articles on contemporary conflicts. His previous reviews include Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval Strategic Planning, Pioneers of Irregular Warfare, Mars Adapting: Military Change During War, A Short History of War, Ancient Greeks at War: Warfare in the Classical World, from Agamemnon to Alexander, Dreadnoughts and Super-Dreadnoughts, The Roman Empire in Crisis, 248-260, A Military History of the Cold War, 1962-1991, Secrets of the Cold War, Ramesses the Great, Rome and Persia: The 700 Hundred Year Rivalry, China’s New Navy, and Assyria: The Rise and Fall of the World's First Empire.

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