The Perfect Soldier: Special Operations, Commandos, and the Future of Us Warfare by James F. Dunnigan
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I See Dead People
by James Dunnigan
March 9, 2014
Afghanistan's President Karzai and many Pushtuns want all the foreign troops gone so the Pushtuns have a better chance of reestablishing their dominance of the government and all of Afghanistan. The non-Pushtun majority opposes that and wants some of the Americans and other foreign troops to remain. Afghanistan is headed for another civil war.
The Pushtun lost control in 2001 when the Northern Alliance triumphed.
The
northern
Afghan
tribes
remember
that in
September
11,
2001
they
were
still
fighting
the
Taliban
government
that
had
not
yet
gained
control
over
all
of
Afghanistan.
T
he
"Northern
Alliance"
of
non-Pushtun
tribes
was
still
holding
out.
The
United
States
sent
in
a
few
hundred
Special
Forces
and
CIA
operators,
a
hundred
million
dollars
in
cash
and
a
few
thousand
smart
bombs
to
help
the
Northern
Alliance
out,
and
the
Taliban
were
broken
and
fleeing
the
country
within
two
months.
The Pushtun still resent this and the non-Pushtuns tried to accommodate the Pushtuns when a new government was formed.
The
northern
tribes
didn't
mind
Pushtuns
getting
some of
the
top
jobs
in
the
new
government (including the presidency),
but
were
no
longer
willing
to
meekly
follow
the
Pushtun
lead
blindly.
The
Pushtun
see
it
differently,
claiming
(with
some
truth)
that
they
did
most
of
the
fighting
against
the
Russians
in
the
1980s,
and
that
many
of
the
northern
tribes
cut
deals
with
the
Russians
(as
did
some
Pushtun
tribes,
something
the
Pushtuns
don't
like
to
talk
about).
That
had
more
to
do
with
Afghan
politics,
(the
northern
and
southern
tribes
disagreed
on
how
to
deal
with
Russia
and
modernization)
than
with
anything
else.
Then
came
the
Taliban
(a
cynical
invention
of
the
Pakistanis,
created
from
Pushtun
refugees
convinced
that
a
Holy
War
would
bring
peace
to
Afghanistan).
Meanwhile,
the
heroin
trade
(growing
poppies
and
using
a
chemical
process
to
turn
the
sap
from
these
plants
into
opium
and
heroin)
moved
from
Pakistan
(where
the
government
saw
it
as
a
curse)
to
Afghanistan.
Many
of
the
same
tribes
that
produced
the
refugees
who
became
the
Taliban,
also
produced
the
most
successful
drug
lords.
The
Pushtun
are
many
things,
including
well
organized
and
ambitious and Russia has always been a willing ally of the northern tribes.
The Taliban today are basically a faction of the Pushtun tribes and the drug trade is basically run by Pushtuns. For most Afghans, the Pushtuns (40 percent of the population) are the enemy and Russia is a neighbor that has more often than not been a useful friend. The Russians are also interested in stopping the Pushtun drug trade and this gives the northern tribes and Russia a common goal to work towards. Expect to see more of Russia in Afghanistan after NATO forces depart next year.
Afghan army leaders and most of the troops want the Americans to stay, at least to provide air support and help with logistics, training and intelligence collecting. The military, which is largely non-Pustun, fears that without the American assistance they will be more vulnerable to the Taliban and drug gangs, both of whom are dominated by Pushtuns from the south (mainly Kandahar and Helmand provinces.) President Karzai and his clan are from Kandahar, but the army is largely non-Pushtun.
While 40 percent of Afghans are Pushtuns (the majority in the south, and within the Taliban), far fewer Pushtuns are in the army. Most troops are from anti-Taliban northern groups (Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbek).
For the last decade it has been fashionable to play down ethnic animosities. But occasionally a Pushtun leader will appear in the media casually reminding everyone that Pushtuns were “born to rule” or “are the true owners of Afghanistan.” Sometimes these attitudes get into print. In
2012
t
he government fired four Pushtun academics for publishing a book on the ethnic groups of Afghanistan that described the Hazara as "liars, stubborn, violent and anti-Islamic." Hazara politicians and non
-
Pushtuns in general, were enraged. That's because to
the
Pushtuns,
anyone
who
is
not
Pushtun
is
"them" and nothing but trouble. Same
deal
with
the
northern
tribes,
who
are
weakened
by
their
lack
of
ethnic
and
tribal
unity
(the
Uzbeks
are
Turks,
the
Hazara
are
Mongols
and
the
Tajiks
are,
like
the
Pushtuns,
cousins
to
the
Iranians
and
Indians).
Thus
no
matter
how
successful
the
Taliban
might
be
in
the
south,
among
their
fellow
Pushtun
(many
of
them
anti-Taliban),
they
still
have
to
face
"
them"; the
northern
tribes,
who
now
have
powerful
foreign
allies
, a combination
that
proved
invincible
in
2001,
and
can
do
so
again
if
called
on.
But that is more likely if some American troops remain in the country. This the Taliban, drug gangs and Pushtuns in general are opposed to. Without their American allies, the Pushtun believe they can, as they usually do, intimidate the more numerous and divided non-Pushtuns into compliance with Pushtun domination.
The
current
Afghan government survives by maintaining some form of good relations between the haughty Pushtuns, and the real majority of Afghanistan (the non-Pushtuns). The Hazara have long been a particular target of Pushtun anger. In part, it's because the Hazara are Shia, while most Afghans are Sunni. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are Sunni radicals, and Sunni radicals consider Shia heretics and in need of killing. The other reason for Hazara hatred is that the Hazara are the descendants of the Mongol conquerors of Afghanistan. The Pushtun do not like to be reminded of what the Mongol invaders did to them. The Pushtuns have specific reasons for disdaining the Turks and Tajiks.
Then there is the fact that the Taliban are a minority within a minority (Pushtuns are 40 percent of the population.) There are some Islamic radicals among the other ethnic minorities, but the Pushtuns dominate the Taliban (in terms of leadership and numbers overall). The biggest asset the Taliban have is their alliance with the drug gangs. This is because the Taliban tolerated and taxed the drug gangs in the 1990s, and continue with that policy. This gives the Taliban the cash they need to keep their terror campaign going, but this also associates the Islamic radicals with the hated drug gangs. Most Afghans will hold their nose and take a drug gang or Taliban bribe. Yet in the overall scheme of things, the majority (over 70 percent) of Afghans would prefer to see the Taliban and drug gangs dead and gone. With the foreign troops gone, that kind of civil war situation is likely to develop.
The Pushtun are worried about the upcoming (April 5th) presidential elections. Karzai cannot run again (constitutional term limits) and the leading candidate is a non-Pushtun (and former Northern Alliance member). The Pushtun are not ready to accept a non-Pushtun as the ruler of all Afghanistan. Non-Pushtuns were not surprised with recent revelations that Karzai had been holding secret meetings with the Taliban. While foreigners may not believe a lot of the stories about corruption in the Karzai clan and connections with the drug gangs and Taliban, most Afghans accept this as perfectly normal. Afghans, most of whom want the Status of Forces agreement with the United States signed, see these links as the main reason Karzai will not sign the agreement. Non-Pushtun politicians are hoping to solve this problem by electing a non-Pushtun as president. The Pushtuns will attempt to prevent this using traditional methods (lots of terror and dead people). Karzai really believes that he can negotiate a peace deal with the divided Taliban. He knows that many Taliban leaders have become very corrupt. A lot of the cash from drug gangs (for security and other services) goes to buying SUVs, trucks and nice houses for the Taliban leaders. These same Taliban seek out equally corrupt army and police commanders to share the wealth (in return for occasional inaction). In many cases this works, but there’s still a problem with the fact that most people in the security forces are not Pushtun and oppose the Pushtun dominating the non-Pushtun majority. There has always been some of this, but now the non-Pushtuns want to share power, not just take whatever the Pushtuns give them (from the foreign aid and other national income there is to share). The non-Pushtuns see an end to Pushtun domination while the Pushtun see any attempt to impose that producing a lot of dead people. Karzai also knows that the Taliban are running out of cash, because many foreign donors have stopped giving because of the growing number of women and children killed by Taliban violence. These donors also know of the corruption among the Taliban leadership and at the moment are more attracted to Islamic terrorists in Syria,
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