Confederate Resistance in Unionist Kentucky

At the onset of the Civil War Kentucky’s secessionist-minded governor, realizing that a majority of Kentuckians were loyal to the Union, declared the state neutral, which oddly benefitted both sides. For five months Kentuckians of both secessionist and loyalist sentiment made not-so-covert efforts to arm themselves and raise troops. Then, on September 4, 1861, Confederate Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk invaded, prompting the Union’s Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to enter the state, and eliciting a declaration by the State Legislature of loyalty to the Union.

Union forces quickly secured control of most of the state. Secession-minded Kentuckians, however, conducted a protracted irregular resistance, aided at times by Confederate attempts to invade the state.

In the Spring of 1862, the Confederate Congress passed the Partisan Ranger Act, to regularized guerrilla operations and provoke a “people’s war” in Union occupied areas. As the Union armies moved more deeply into the Confederacy, partisan bands took up the fight in the state against Union lines of supply and loyalist Kentuckians. Led by the likes of William Quantrill, Adam Rankin Johnson, and Champ Ferguson, partisans caused significant trouble for Union forces.

Lindow concentrates on the action of Adam Johnson and Robert Martin along the Ohio and Cumberland Rivera, and against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and the effort of commanders such as John Crooks and Gabriel Netter to oppose them. He makes a strong point that partisan bands, inflamed by the Emancipation Proclamation and the formation of the U.S.C.T., became increasingly ruthless, torturing and murdering civilians and prisoners-of-war, Unchecked by Confederate armies or the Richmond government, some bands came to control extensive regions, while wreaking havoc across parts of Kentucky.

Lindow argues that the partisans did not have to control territory to be effective, as they could disrupt Union control of the state by harassing Union armies, impeding supply lines, sabotage, and so forth. In the end, Lincoln tried to remedy the situation in Kentucky, and in nearby West Virginia, by pouring in thousands of troops to keep down significantly smaller forces.

By early 1864, the depredations of the partisans had come in for criticism by senior Confederate officers, who viewed Ranger units as nothing more than bandits and a place for deserters from the different theaters' main armies. While the Partisan Ranger Act was rescinded, some Ranger organizations continued to operate, with some success, particularly in Virginia, where John S. Mosby and John Hanson McNeil were allowed to continue in operation.

Although this reviewer would have preferred to see more first-hand accounts from various Kentuckians as to their views on the war and white supremacy, We Shall Conquer or Die throws light on a relatively obscure and neglected part of the war in a border state in the West.

Derrick Lindow spent years examining primary sources that allowed him to uncover the remarkable material to write this significant, trailblazing treatise. He tells an outstanding story for buffs who like reading about this style of fighting in the Civil War and for more serious students of Kentucky in the war who are seeking to understand the role of the partisans. This reviewer highly recommends We Shall Conquer or Die.

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Note: We Shall Conquer or Die is also available in e-editions.

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