January 17, 2025: As of early 2025 Ukraine has seven Patriot batteries and NATO nations have assured Ukraine that additional supplies of missiles will arrive as quickly as they can be taken from existing stockpiles or manufactured in the United States. Japan is the only other nation to manufacture Patriot missiles and they are increasing production to replace the missiles NATO nations have sent to Ukraine.

Patriot systems began operating in Ukraine two years ago with the usual spectacular results. This was especially the case because the Ukrainians tended to find additional uses for many of the weapons they received from NATO countries.

Since 1970 over 10,000 Patriot missiles and 1,500 launchers have been produced. After decades of service, some were updated while others were scrapped. Patriot missiles can, with regular upgrades and refurbishment, remain in storage and usable for over 40 years. A growing number of Patriot missiles are doing just that, but many are still fired each year for training and testing. Most Patriot batteries are equipped with both longer-range GEM-T missiles for aircraft and shorter-range PAC-3 MSE ones for ballistic missiles or, if necessary, aircraft. The PAC 2 is older, cheaper, and designed to intercept manned aircraft at ranges up to 160 kilometers, while the PAC 3 is the newest and most expensive version costing $4 million to $5 million each. The Patriot system, with continued upgrades, will likely remain in production until the 2040s, though it badly needs a mobile replacement for various reasons such as attack by swarms of cheap UAVs, plus that the precise location of Patriot radars can be easily determined from orbit. Demand for Patriot missiles in Ukraine means that nearly all the older Patriot missiles are being used and the manufacturers are working overtime to produce more missiles.

Each Patriot battery is manned by about a hundred troops and contains a radar plus four or more launchers. The launcher is designed to use both the smaller PAC 3 missile as well as the original and larger PAC 2 anti-aircraft version. A Patriot launcher can hold sixteen PAC 3 missiles versus four PAC 2s. A PAC 2 missile weighs about a ton while a PAC 3 weighs about a third of that. The PAC 3 has a shorter range that was originally 20 kilometers, but the latest version can do 35 kilometers. The larger PAC-2 can reach 160 kilometers.

Currently Patriot air defense systems are found worldwide. For example, there are 60 Patriot batteries in service in the United States. A Patriot battery includes only one fire unit with up to 8 launchers, one radar, one command post, communication, and support vehicles.

NATO members are heavy users of Patriot systems. Germany has about 10 Patriot PAC-3 batteries; The Netherlands has less than 3 Patriot PAC-3 batteries; Sweden is in the process of receiving up to 4, and currently has up to 2 Patriot PAC-3 batteries; Romania has up to 7 with currently up to 4 more Patriot PAC-3 batteries in the process of being received. Poland has 2 Patriot batteries and plans for up to 12 PAC-3 batteries. Greece has 6 Patriot PAC-2 batteries; Spain has 3 Patriot PAC-2 batteries. Japan has 24 Patriot anti-missile PAC-3 batteries; South Korea has eight Patriot PAC-3 batteries; Kuwait has 7-8 batteries (possibly 6 more in PAC-2); Qatar has 4-6 Patriot PAC-3 batteries; Saudi Arabia has 25 batteries; UAE has nine Patriot PAC-3 batteries and Israel has 4 Patriot anti-aircraft PAC-2 batteries.

Ukraine has asked for Patriot batteries European countries sought to locate and send as many Patriot batteries as they could to Ukraine. Germany organized this effort. By 2025 most of the NATO Patriot batteries were in Ukraine or on their way.

In early 2024 eight Patriot batteries arrived in Ukraine. The Ukrainians wanted 25 Patriot batteries and over a thousand Patriot missiles to defend military and civilian targets from Russian missile attacks. The Patriot batteries already in Ukraine made it impossible for Russia to use their jet fighter-bombers inside Ukraine. Russia does use these aircraft from inside Russia, near the Ukrainian border, to launch glide bombs at targets inside Ukraine. These GPS guided bombs can be intercepted by a Patriot system that is within about 150 kilometers of the target.

Russia had problems producing missiles because of Western economic sanctions. Undeterred, the Russians improvised. They developed ways to produce cruise missiles anyway, but not as many or as capable. Russia has found new sources for components, some of them obtained by smuggling or purchases of components that can be adapted for use in missile production. Most of the smuggling is done via Armenia and Turkey, two countries that are hospitable to smuggling if it has some benefits for locals. Although Turkey is a NATO member, smuggling is tolerated if the smugglers will pay the right people for access. Such corrupt behavior has long prevented Turkey from joining the European Union.

Russia has expended most of its missile stockpiles and the sanctions had, for a while, prevented Russia from replacing those missiles. Restoring Russian missile production hurts Ukraine because the missiles are difficult to intercept and cause a lot of damage to Ukrainian infrastructure and armed forces. NATO is seeking to disrupt the smuggling while it provides Ukraine with more air defense systems that can deal with incoming missiles. The problem is that NATO cannot supply Ukraine with enough defensive systems to protect all the economic targets Russia wants to attack. NATO considers sanctions the best way to prevent increased Russian missile production, but it appears that current efforts will not be sufficient. The solution is more effective sanctions and that effort is underway.

For sanctions to work they must constantly evolve as the sanctioned nations seek ways to evade the sanctions. This is an economic conflict as harsher sanctions are easier to impose than they are to evade. Russia is already spending more of its national budget on weapons production than it is on social services for the Russian population. The Russian government is taking a risk here because, if too much more privation is imposed on its civilian population, there will be more internal opposition to the war effort. This cannot be ignored but Russia feels they can endure this until they can’t. It is difficult to determine how much privation Russians will tolerate before they actively protest the situation. Russia has been able to limit popular protests to the war effort but the protests can increase to the point where the Russian government cannot ignore the welfare of its own people.