February 20, 2026: The innovative, extensive and effective use of drones in the Ukraine War has alarmed major military powers worldwide. Everyone is seeking ways of effectively integrating drones into their current military forces and war plans. Because of Ukraine, the European NATO countries are expanding and upgrading their forces to deter further Russian aggression. Over half a billion Europeans, backed by 326 million Americans should be enough to deter further aggression by 145 million bankrupt and war weary Russians.

It’s a different story in the Pacific, where an increasingly aggressive and heavily armed Chinese military is preparing for war. Not a major conflict, China could not afford that and really only wants to conquer Taiwan and merge it with China. Such a conflict would be short, violent and possibly indecisive. Drones play a role in that. China is aware of that and has already developed a microwave anti-drone weapon that can quickly and cheaply destroy drones several kilometers away. The U.S. and Israel have developed similar systems and Taiwan has access to much of that technology. Taiwan and China have also been developing drone swarm technology and the use of AI/Artificial Intelligence technology to enable the swarms to operate effectively when facing massive electronic jamming.

The drone factor makes a Chinese attempt to take Taiwan by forces less likely. While drones are a new opportunity, an amphibious operation against Taiwan is nothing like the land war Russia and Ukraine have been fighting.

Everyone could find out how drones might impact current NATO doctrine by examining similar situations in the past. Current American and NATO tactics began emerging in the late 1970s when the United States sought a new combat doctrine to make the best use of new weapons, an all-volunteer force and growing air superiority. West Germany was then urging the United States to adopt tactics that would mean losing less German territory in the opening stages of a war. In 1982 this led to the American AirLand Battle doctrine, which emphasized meeting a mainly Russian Warsaw Pact invasion by attacking as well as defending. West Germany was reassured as were those who had studied the 1972 Arab Israeli war. This conflict began with a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria which was quickly defeated by an Israeli active defense that emphasized attacking as well as defending. The Americans had already adopted an active defense doctrine in 1978 but AirLand Battle was a refinement of that, and evolved to the present with improved versions of these tactics.

The Russians interpreted AirLand Battle as the result of how much post-Vietnam military reforms had turned NATO defense plans into an offensive opportunity for NATO that made any Russian attack less likely to succeed and vulnerable to a NATO invasion of East Europe. The 1991 Iraq war certainly confirmed this, but Russians attributed that to poor quality Iraqi officers and troops.

After the East European Soviet satellite governments collapsed starting in 1989, it was revealed that the Soviets had become less confident of the ability and willingness of East European Warsaw Pact armies to assist Russian forces in attack or defense. Part of this was due to the aftereffects of the crackdown in East Europe after the uprisings of the 1950s and 1960s. Western intelligence officials interviewed many of East European civilians getting out and thought the refugees were exaggerating. They weren’t and that became obvious in 1989, and again two years later when the USSR itself collapsed. Once the Ukraine War has ended, the Russian military may accept that the NATO tactics were a major reason for their failure in Ukraine. Russia will have a difficult but not impossible time implementing a version of the NATO tactics for their forces. It would mean changing how their officers are trained and finally getting serious about reviving the use of NCOs, something the communists eliminated in the 1920s to prevent sergeants from leading another revolution as they did in the early 1920 to create the Soviet Union. In other words, Russia still has the same problems it has been burdened with since the Cold War ended in 1991. While Russia quickly adapted to drone warfare, that was in wartime and as of early 2026, Ukraine is more confident of winning their war with the Russians than the Russians are.