September 16, 2024: Over a year ago it was obvious that drones were dominating the battlefield in Ukraine. In July 2024 a senior Ukrainian defense official once more confirmed this and observed that the dominance of drones in combat was increasing. Since the war began in early 2022 drone use has increased at the expense of traditional artillery. The reasons are obvious. Drones are more flexible, cheaper and come in many different models. Drones can be controlled by nearby operators and sent after targets over a thousand kilometers distant using GPS guidance and several backup systems if electronic jamming of GPS signals is encountered.

This situation began once Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022 and both sides quickly lost most of their conventional offensive weapons in combat. These losses included armored vehicles, especially tanks for the Russians. Longer range weapons, like artillery, which delivered most of its fire power to targets 30 kilometers distant and a smaller number of guided missiles, which could reach targets over a hundred kilometers distant, tended to survive the heavy losses suffered by armored vehicles that fought at close range. The Ukrainians quickly ran out of artillery ammunition, were the first to adopt drones because they had to, and the Russians are still trying to catch up.

The Russians lost most of their tube artillery in 2023 by burning their tube liners out. By the second half of 2023 both sides had turned to drones, which were cheaper, easier to obtain and provided more flexible alternatives. It was soon discovered that drones had a seemingly endless number of new capabilities. One of the more crucial qualities was the ease of obtaining drones and modifying them or building larger or smaller versions. The technology required for current drone warfare evolved over the last few decades as the commercial quadcopters and hobbyist fixed wing remotely controlled aircraft achieved a degree of maturity in design and reliability. This made it possible for users or developers to confidently and quickly modify existing drones t0 meet their needs.

Most of the resulting drones were short range models operating no farther than ten kilometers from their user. This meant the combat zone was a much more dangerous place than it ever had been in the past. The surveillance was constant and round the clock. More expensive drones with night-vision sensors, usually based on a combination of object and heat detection and interpretation, provided adequate surveillance at night or in fog or misty conditions. Then there are logistical considerations. Reusable drones have to be recharged or refueled between missions. Drones built as single-use weapons have to be checked out before actual use. This is especially true for the long-range attack models. These fixed-wing drones go after targets a thousand kilometers or more distant and tend to use a single diesel or gasoline fueled engine. These engines must be sturdy and reliable because everything depends on a reliable propulsion system. Another critical component is the navigation and target acquisition system. Resistance to electronic jamming is essential. Electronic jamming technology is constantly evolving to deal with improved guidance systems that make earlier jammers ineffective or less effective. This makes every new drone design likely to be compromised and obsolete in short order. With the inexpensive technology drones use, rapid evolution is easier to achieve and the ability to quickly develop ways to disrupt new tech is essential.

A major limitation was the need for trained drone operators. They need over a hundred hours of training before they are able to start operating these drones, and another hundred hours of actual use before they are able to make the most out of the system. These drones are difficult to shoot down until they get close to the ground and the shooter is close enough, as in less than a few hundred meters, to successfully target a drone with a bullet or two and bring it down. Troops are rarely in position to do this, so most of these drones are able to complete their mission, whether it is a one-way attack or a reconnaissance and surveillance mission. The recon missions are usually survivable and enable the drone to be reused. All these drones are constantly performing surveillance, which means that either side commits enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line, to a depth, into enemy territory, of at least a few kilometers. The Ukrainians penetrate farther – they often have effective drone coverage 20 kilometers into Russian-held territory. This makes it extremely difficult for the Russians to supply their front-line troops, even with drinking water.

This massive use of FPV (First Person Viewing) armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine and both sides are producing as many as they can. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in terms of design and use and becoming more effective and essential.

Ukraine has created a new branch of their military, the Drone Force. This is in addition to the Ukrainian Air Force that consists of manned aircraft. The Drone Force does not control the drones Ukrainian forces use regularly, but does contribute to developing new drone models and organizing mass production for those new models that are successful. Drones have been an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in the Ukraine’s current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap, at about $500 each, quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a kilometer or more away using FPV goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Adding night vision at least doubles the cost for each drone, so not all of them have that capability. Each of these drones carries half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. This is an awesome and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.

Armed FPV drones have revolutionized warfare in Ukraine and both sides are producing as many as they can. Earlier in the Ukraine War Russia used Iranian Shahed-136 drones that Iran sold for about $200,000 each. Ukraine demonstrated that you could design and build drones with similar capabilities at less than a tenth of what the Shahed-136. The Iranian drone was more complex than it needed to be. Even the Russians soon realized this and turned from the Shahed-136 for more capable drones they copied from Ukrainian designs or ones Russians designed. Ukrainian drone proliferation began when many individual Ukrainians or small teams designed and built drones. The drones served as potential candidates for widespread use and mass production. This proliferation of designers and manufacturers led to rapid evolution of drone capabilities and uses. Those who could not keep up were less successful in combat and suffered higher losses.

Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with the most effective drones. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in terms of design and use and becoming more effective and essential.

One countermeasure that can work for a while is electronic jamming of the drones control signal. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to cope with this. Most drones have flight control software that sends drones with jammed control signals back to where they took off from to land for later use. The jammers are on the ground and can be attacked by drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal. Countermeasures can be overcome and the side that can do this more quickly and completely has an advantage. That advantage is usually temporary because both sides are putting a lot of effort into keeping their combat drones effective on the battlefield.

Air forces have ceased to be dominant when it comes to influencing the war on the ground. This is despite efforts to maintain their ability to bomb targets in direct support of ground operations. Air forces traditionally have blind spots in tactical air reconnaissance which hurts their overall effectiveness. Blame this on a bad attitude towards BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment). This is the business of figuring out what to bomb, and what the impact on the enemy is after you bomb. The problem of the air force leaders being deceived by the people on the ground being bombed began during World War II. This was when air forces used large scale aerial bombing for the first time. Right after that conflict, the U.S. did a thorough survey of the impact of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan. It was discovered that the impact was far different from what air force BDA during the war had indicated. The U.S. air force vowed to do better next time. But as experience in Korea (1950-3), Vietnam (1965-72), Kuwait (1991) and Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), the war on terror (since 2002) demonstrated, the enemy on the ground continued to have an edge when it came to deceiving the most energetic BDA efforts. Starting in 2022, the Ukraine War revealed the BDA situation had changed, because of the constant drone presence.

Before drones, the only proven technique for beating the BDA problem was to have people on the ground, up close, checking up on targets, while the fighting was going on. Those with powerful air forces do not want to do this because of the risk of some of their commandos getting killed or captured, and because the intel and air force people were sure that they knew what enemy was up to down there. After 2022 FPV drones solved that problem.

During the early 21st century, when the U.S. developed persistent drone surveillance, the irregular forces they were facing proved capable of reducing the effectiveness of the drone effort. This spotlights another useful fact; airpower can be useful on the ground but that happens over time and not quickly. Small drones changed that by providing continuous surveillance and the ability of drones to attack anything an FPV drone could detect.

Despite being a successful high-tech operation, American air forces, especially the Navy and USAF, frequently have trouble adjusting to changes they do not agree with. When the Cold War ended in 1991 the air force was still largely thinking about continuing to operate as they had done in the Cold War, but the technology and tactics of warfare were changing. The post-Cold War enemy no longer consisted of large, organized forces spread over huge areas. The enemy was increasingly irregulars who were harder to spot from the air. The air force reluctantly adapted, in part because the army and CIA adopted new reconnaissance and surveillance techniques like drones and persistent surveillance. This pattern is returning as the air force reorganizes after the decade of heavy combat and big budgets the war on terror produced. Now the air force is turning its attention to a near-peer opponent in the form of a rapidly expanding and modernizing Chinese military. Unexpectedly the Ukraine War emerged first with Russia and Ukraine fighting each other. Ukrainians had the advantage of material and intellectual support from NATO countries. Ukraine was the first to develop and use small, innovative drone designs. These often came from civilians, who were seeking to assist friends of family members in the army. Building drones in homes or garages became a major source of drones for Ukrainian troops.

Russia adapted to their disadvantage in drone development by concentrating on electronic jammers, as well as building a lot of drones, often copying successful Ukrainian drones. By rapidly upgrading their jammer technology, Russians can disrupt a lot of new Ukrainian drone tech for a while. This disruption is becoming more important for the Russians because Ukraine has developed several generations of long range that are increasingly reaching their targets deep a thousand or more kilometers inside Russia. That means Russian economic and military facilities far from Ukraine are suddenly under attack. These targets include refineries and fuel storage sites as well as weapons development, manufacturing, and storage facilities. In 2023 these attacks destroyed about fifteen percent of Russian refining capacity, reducing, for months, the amount of vehicle fuel available for commercial and military users.

Air bases and ballistic missile storage or launch sites are also under attack. Targets as distant as the Russian Northern Fleet bases around Murmansk are under attack. This has caused a shortage of anti-aircraft systems that can intercept some or all of the drones depending on how many drones and air defense systems are involved.

To deal with this Ukraine has increased production of drones considerably and the objective for 2024 is two million new drones built, mostly armed ones. Halfway through 2024, the production goal is being met. These numbers are comparable to artillery ammunition production, which for Russia is estimated to be three million rounds a year. Hundreds of armed drones used in single attacks are seen as more effective than conventional tube artillery, which is now seen as a poor substitute for drones. Factories for manufacturing drones are often established in underground facilities to avoid Russian missile attacks. Nearly all the components needed for drone production are available commercially and can be purchased from European or American suppliers and imported. Custom components are manufactured locally in well protected installations. Drone quality and quantity are a Ukrainian advantage they do not want to lose.

Russia is also increasing drone production, in part because they lost their few A-50 surveillance aircraft in 2023 and since then depended on drones for surveillance. Another Russian disadvantage is their reliance on larger and more expensive surveillance and attack drones. The Russians have been quick to adapt and copy Ukrainian drone designs whenever they obtain a new one that had crash landed intact. Often all it takes is a description of a new Ukrainian drone. Russian drone manufacturers have become adept at copying Ukrainian drone designs based on minimal information. Because of this both Ukrainian and Russian troops face the same drone threat.