August 1, 2024: NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) weapons are still around. This was recently demonstrated in Russia. A significant Russian nuclear accident took place at the Andreyeva Bay Soviet naval base 569 in February 1982. Andreyeva Bay is a radioactive waste repository 55 km northwest of Murmansk and 60 km from the Norwegian border, on the western shore of the Kola Peninsula. The repository entered service in 1961. In February 1982 a nuclear accident occurred in which about 700,000 tons of highly radioactive water was released into the Barents Sea from a pool in building 5 of the repository over the next few years. Cleanup of the accident took place from 1983 to 1989. About 1,000 people took part in the cleanup effort.

The nuclear fuel repository, constructed in the early 1960s, was a naval base on the shore of the Zapadnaya Litsa bay. It consisted of two piers, a stationary mooring bay, a sanitation facility, spent fuel pools in building 5 that was unused since the cleanup ended in 1989, three 1,000 cubic meter dry storage containers, a 40,000-ton crane, an open-air field for storing spent nuclear fuel containers, a security checkpoint, and other technical facilities. In 1982 the area contains spent nuclear fuel in storage facility Building 5 consisting of about 22,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies, solid radioactive waste in storage facility Building 7, and liquid radioactive waste in storage facility Building 6.

Building 5 contained two pools for storing spent fuel assemblies, encased in steel drums. Each drum contained 5-7 spent fuel assemblies, weighing 350 kg fully loaded. Each of the pools was 60 meters long, 3 meters wide, 6 meters deep, and had a volume of 1,000 cubic meters. Each was designed for about 2,000 drums. The drums were suspended underwater from massive chains, which were attached to anchor points a certain distance from each other to hopefully avoid an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction from starting. The water served as a radiation shield for people on the deck around the pools. The drums were placed underwater using the chains and a crane cart, but due to the construction's unreliability, drums often fell to the bottom of the pool. As a result, spent nuclear fuel drums dangerously piled up at the bottom which defeated the protection from uncontrolled nuclear reactions by the chains and anchor points.

Someone who worked there remarked that the first time they saw all this they were shocked. The facility seemed like a nightmare. The facility was an enormous black windowless building atop a cliff. The entrance to building 5 was decorated with deformed trucks previously used for carrying nuclear fuel and half-torn-down heavy gates. Inside, the building was dilapidated, and deteriorating electrical equipment was another hazard. Building 5 was completely radioactive.

The right-hand pool in building 5 started leaking in February 1982. Finding cracks in the metal coating required diving into the pool, which was out of the question due to the gamma radiation levels in the vicinity of the nuclear waste drums. An attempt to eliminate the leak was made by pouring in 20 sacks of flour, thus filling the cracks with dough. That did not last and the leak continued. Later it was found there was ice on the right side of the building. This indicated that earlier containment efforts were ineffective.

In April 1982, the basement part of the building was filled with 600 cubic meters of concrete but this was ineffective. There was a risk of contamination of nearby Zapadnaya Litsa bay. In order to safeguard against radioactive leaks, iron-lead-concrete covers, weighing thousands of tons, were built over the pool. In fact it was later discovered that it was only good fortune that prevented the collapse of the whole structure.

In early 1983 government officials confirmed the closing of the repository, except for work related to the cleanup of the accident. No more spent nuclear fuel was loaded in building 5. March 1983 through September 1987 saw spent fuel unloaded from the left-hand pool. All of the fuel was unloaded and sent to the Mayak nuclear facility. As of December 1989, all 1,500 drums of nuclear waste from building 5 were declared dealt with.

This was not the case. Poor welding seam quality in the pools' coating led to more leaks. The left pool sprouted a leak due to the building sagging under the weight of the iron-lead-concrete covers over the right pool. Specialists believed that temperature changes in the pool's water stressed welding seams, tearing them. When building 5's repository was designed, it was assumed that the water would be kept at a constant temperature by heat from the nuclear assemblies suspended under the surface. A separate water heating system was thus deemed unnecessary. That did not work because the extreme Arctic climate created a thick layer of ice in winter. In order to solve this problem, the ice was melted using steam from the boiler. This was a violation of radiation safety guidelines. Radioactive air spread through the building and leaked into the outside atmosphere.

Several workers were killed during the cleanup efforts due to accidents, inadequate protective equipment and the generally dangerous state of the facility.