June 4, 2007:
There are several important issues to
consider now that many terrorist groups
are claiming ties to al Qaeda. To begin with, are they actually
connected to Osama's gang or merely proclaiming themselves his henchmen? If
they do have a real tie to al Qaeda Central, it's probable that information,
money, and even personnel will be passing back and forth. This may make the
subsidiaries more effective, perhaps even enabling them to coordinate with
other formal branches of al Qaeda, but it also makes them more vulnerable, as
counter-terrorism organizations are more
likely to intercept the flow of
personnel, money, and information, which would enable permit them to dismantle
their networks when they need to. On the other hand, many of these new organizations
could just be self-proclaimed followers of al Qaeda, This would give them some
prestige in the loosely coordinated world of Islamism, and even bring in cash
from local Islamists, though not necessarily much technical support (as provided by al Qaeda to its real
subsidiaries). Without links to al Qaeda Center, they might be relatively
immune to some of the more sophisticated means of tracking them down. After
all, if there are no communications to intercept there's no information you can
act on. But the lack of a tie to al Qaeda could also prove a vulnerability. The
self-proclaimed groups may take actions that conflict with some of al Qaeda's
stated policies and objectives. Being locally-based, their brand of Islamic
fundamentalism may differ from that being peddled by al Qaeda. This could turn
al Qaeda Center into an opponent, which would be good for the overall fight
against Islamic terrorism. This is what apparently happened in Iraq, where
local al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi, got into a dispute with al Qaeda
Center over tactics (Zarqawi wanted to kill lots of Shia civilians, and did not
care if Sunni civilians died as a side effect). Al Qaeda Center is believed to
have provided useful information to the American forces that tracked down and
killed Zarqawi last year.
So far, the new al Qaeda affiliates, perhaps
mindful of what happened to Zarqawi, are generally towing the party line
(avoiding civilian casualties.) The Egyptians brain trust that holds most of
the senior jobs at al Qaeda Center, are ever mindful of how their Moslem
Brotherhood was defeated in Egypt a decade ago because too many civilians died
during terrorist attacks. These Egyptians also remember how the Moslem
Brotherhood was crushed partly because of the many factions within it. Some of
the factions eventually made deals with the government, went legit, and sold
out the more radical brothers.