August 4,
2008: The U.S. recently accused the
Pakistani ISI (Inter Service Intelligence agency) of being directly involved in
a recent terror bombing of the Indian embassy in Afghanistan. The accusation
not only involved CIA representatives going to Pakistan to present intelligence information directly to
Pakistani leaders, but also leaking the event to the media. This was the most
recent of many instances where ISI has supported Islamic terrorists, and this
time Pakistan reacted by saying they would root out "Taliban spies" in the ISI.
The problem is that these Islamic radicals have been operating openly in the
ISI for three decades, and were put there by the government in the late 1970s,
when it was decided that Islamic conservatism was the solution for Pakistan's
problems (corruption and religious/ethnic conflicts.) These guys are not just "Taliban
spies," but Pakistani intelligence professionals that believe in Islamic
radicalism.
The ISI
itself was created in 1948 as a reaction to the inability of the IB
(Intelligence Bureau, which collected intelligence on foreign countries in
general) and MI (Military Intelligence, which collected intel on military
matters) to work together and provide useful information. The ISI was supposed to
take intel from IB and MI, analyze it and present it to senior government
officials. But in the 1950s, the government began to use the ISI to collect
intel on Pakistanis, especially those suspected of opposing the current
government. This backfired eventually, and in the 1970s, the ISI was much
reduced by a civilian government. But when another coup took place in 1977, and
the new military government decided that religion was the cure for what ailed
the country.
Typically,
the Pakistani generals seized control of the government every decade or so,
when the corruption and incompetence of elected officials became too much for
the military men to tolerate. The generals never did much better, and
eventually there were elections, and the cycle continued. The latest iteration
began in 1999, when the army took over, and was only voted out of power last
year. Civilian governments tend to be hostile to the ISI, and apparently they
are going to make a real effort to clear out many of the Islamic radicals in
the ISI. But as recent attempt by the government to take control of the ISI
backfired when the generals said they would not allow it. Nothing is simple in
Pakistan.
The ISI
grew particularly strong during the 1980s, when billions of dollars, most of it
in the form of military and economic aid, arrived from the oil-rich Arab
governments of the Persian Gulf. All this was to support the Afghans who were
resisting a Russian invasion (in support of Afghan communists who had taken
control of the government, and triggered a revolt of the tribes). The Afghan
communists were atheists, and this greatly offended Saudi Arabia, and other
Arab countries, who feared that Russia would encourage Arab communists to rebel elsewhere. So the
resistance to the Russians in Afghanistan was declared a holy war which, after
a fashion, it was. After about nine years of fighting the tribes, the Russians
got tired of their slow progress (and more pressing problems back home, like
the collapse of their economy from decades of communist mismanagement).
The
Russians were gone by 1989 (and the Soviet Union collapsed three years later),
but the Afghans promptly fell upon each other and the civil war seemed
never-ending. This upset Pakistan, which
wanted to send millions of Afghan refugees back home. Few of the refugees were
interested as long as Afghans were still fighting each other. So the ISI
created its own faction, the Taliban, by recruiting teachers and students from
a network of religious schools that had been established (with the help of
Saudi Arabian religious charities) in the 1980s. The most eager recruits were
young Afghans from the refugee camps. The Taliban were fanatical, and most
Afghans were willing to support them because they brought peace and justice.
But the Taliban never conquered all of Afghanistan, especially in the north,
where there were few Pushtun tribes (most Taliban were Pushtuns, from tribes in
southern Afghanistan). The Pushtuns were about 40 percent of the population,
and had always been the most prominent faction in Afghanistan (the king of
Afghanistan was traditionally a Pushtun.)
Although a
military junta was again running Pakistan when September 11, 2001 came along,
the president of the country, an army general (Pervez Musharraf), sided with
the United States, and turned against the Taliban. But many in the ISI
continued to support the Taliban, and the army was too dependent on the ISI
(for domestic intelligence, and to control Islamic militants that were
attacking India, especially in Kashmir) to crack down on the ISI.
Al Qaeda
took this betrayal badly, and declared war on the Pakistani government. The ISI
was used to seek out and kill or capture most of the hostile al Qaeda
operatives in Pakistan. But the ISI insured that Islamic terrorists who
remained neutral were generally left alone. The ISI thwarted government efforts
to have the army clear the al Qaeda out of the border areas (populated largely
by Pushtun tribes, there being more Pushtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan).
But now, in one sense, it's September 11, 2001 all over again. The U.S. has
told Pakistan that it is fed up with getting screwed around by the ISI, and if
Pakistan doesn't clean out the ISI, and shut down Islamic terrorists along the
Afghan border, NATO, U.S. and Afghan troops will cross the border and do it.
Pakistan
wants continued U.S. military aid to bolster its defenses against India. But if
it suddenly has a hostile U.S. in Afghanistan, and less (or no) military aid,
it's general military situation will be, well, not good. While Afghanistan, and
the foreign troops there, are dependent on Pakistani ports and trucking
companies for supplies, Pakistan is also dependent on the U.S. Navy for access
to the sea. Pakistan does not want to go to war with the United States in order
to defend Islamic terrorists it openly says it is at war with. Pakistan is
being forced to destroy the Islamic radical movement it has nurtured over the
last three decades, although it's still questionable if there's enough
political will in Pakistan to actually do the deed.