British Sea Power, from the end of the “French Wars” through World War II

This is the final volume of Rodger’s excellent trilogy on the Royal Navy. Following upon The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660-1649 (1999) and The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (2005), it covers the period from the end of the “French War” to that of the Second World War. The volume starts out strong in the immediate post 1815 period. But then it begins to have issues, mostly of detail. I learned a great deal from Rodger, but I also had to double-check material that he brings up. The fact that he works in multiple languages is a wonderful change from far too many British and American writers.

Rodger is not a fan of Admiral Jackie Fisher of HMS Dreadnought fame. In addition, he has strong, and likely correct views, on many institutions and individuals (like Frederic Dreyer, the American Admiral King, or Germany’s Admiral Dönitz).

I am glad he points out the World War I German surface fleet sailors (though not necessarily all the officers) spent the night on their warships while in harbor (p. 287). Many writers miss this point.

The rivalry between the Royal Navy and the RAF is well covered, and he also delves into issues in foreign navies and their decisions about airpower (pp. 384-386 & elsewhere).

Rodger also details the German plans (we now enter Hitler's fantasy world); the Super Z-Plan put forth in 1940 that called for 80 battleships, 15 to 20 cruisers, etc. This is just after the "light battleship" Scharnhorst had required a Swiss firm to supply her engines (p. 338).

He has interesting revelations throughout the book, and he handled the Italian X MAS commander Junio Valerio Borghese quite well, even bringing in his coup attempt in 1970. Borghese is still a non-person in Italian naval history which Rodger notes.

The extensive Bibliography is worth the price of the book, yet the absence of Gary Staff (W. W. I), Holloway Frost (Jutland), and Ian Buxton's book on monitors (which are discussed) from the bibliography was a surprise.

That the editing failed to catch errors of detail is abysmal and an embarrassment. The publisher, Allen Lane, an imprint of Penguin Books should have done better. As the book goes on, Rodger also does repeat himself in places.

At the height of the border dispute in 1846 with the United States a powerful Razee, HMS America, was ordered to the Pacific coast. The captain learned of a shipment of gold, silver, etc. on a British warship - when transported by a British warship the captain received a percentage of the cargo. HMS America did not pick up the treasure at Mazatlán, but much further south, from another British warship transporting the treasure and the Captain of the America pulled rank (p. 76) to secure the shipment.

Rodger confuses the USN Monitor for the CSS Virginia/Merrimac and ramming; the Monitor was not built with a ram. This spills into a mention of the Battle of Lissa (pp. 140 & 145).

The Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12 was fought primarily in Libya and not the Balkans (p. 235).

The "I" Class destroyer had quintuple torpedo banks (p. 312).

The Treaty of Versailles allowed Germany to retain, in addition to other warships, six older light cruisers, which Rodger omits (p. 319).

The Norwegian torpedoes that were fired at the Blücher in Oslo fjord were 18-inch and not 21-inch (p. 396).

Mussolini wanted to enter a war in Europe after the 1942 Exposition in Rome. This was to obtain cash from the program, and it might have slid into 1943, but the Fall of '42 was what Mussolini wanted (p. 406).

At the battle of Calabria in 1940 HMS Gloucester was hit by Italian bombers (p. 410).

Malta in the summer of 1942 was down to 1300-1600 calories a day for the Maltese, not 2300 (they would have loved that many calories!) (p. 474).

The Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal was not accomplished over one night (p. 536). Three nights were required for the bulk of the evacuation.

Despite the many minor errors, Rodger’s study is well worth a read. I have learned a lot, often when he is working in a foreign language. It just is not as tight as the first two volumes. And he wanted to complete the project.

---///---

Our Reviewer: Jack Greene is the author or co-author of numerous works in naval and military history, such as The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940-1943, Rommel's North Africa Campaign: September 1940-November 1942, and The Black Prince and The Sea Devils. He previously reviewed Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel and The French Fleet: Ships, Strategy and Operations, 1870-1918, The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century, Birth and Fall of an Empire: The Italian Army in East Africa, Fascist Italy at War: 1939-1943, and Mussolini, Mustard Gas and the Fascist Way of War.

---///---

Note: The Price of Victory is also available in paperback & e-editions.

StrategyPage reviews are published in cooperation with The New York Military Affairs Symposium

www.nymas.org