January 1, 2009:
Israel's attempt to halt the terrorist rocket
and mortar fire, from Gaza into southern Israel, has to deal with military, and
political, issues. The obvious targets, like the weapons themselves, and the
men who fire them, were hit early on. But long term, there has to be a change
in who runs Gaza. Even when Israel ran Gaza (before they left in August, 2005),
there was terrorist violence. Hamas, and other terrorist groups, began firing
the locally made Kassam rockets in late 2001. The targets were mostly Israelis
inside Gaza. The Israelis pulled out of Gaza in 2005 with the understanding
that the Palestinians could run the place, shut down the terrorist, and left
everyone live in peace.
This did not work, mainly because the most
popular politicians, like Hamas, advocated the destruction of Israel, not
peaceful coexistence. This line has been pushed in Palestinian media (in
Arabic, not English), education and cultural activities for decades. It is
deliberate, and intended to provide a supply of young men willing to make
suicidal attacks on Israel, and to make it socially difficult for their parents
to complain about the loss. While it has become an article of faith among
Palestinians that, despite consistent failure, they will ultimately triumph
over Israel, many Palestinian leaders try to work with Israel. There was almost
a peace deal in 2000, but at the last minute, the leadership was persuaded that
a terror campaign against Israel would improve the terms. This proved to be
another disastrous error, and now the Palestinians are split between Gaza
(ruled by terrorist organization Hamas) and the West Bank (ruled by the
corrupt, and inept, Fatah, the group that turned down the 2000 deal).
Thus the Israeli strategy here appears to
consist of doing as much damage to Hamas as possible, and then leaving it to
Fatah to try and resume running Gaza. Some in the Hamas leadership see this,
which is why some Hamas leaders have opposed allowing continued rocket attacks
on Israel during the recent ceasefire. Many in Hamas believe that it's best to
make some kind of peace with Israel until a large supply of rockets can be
stockpiled in Gaza. Then, a coordinated attack, with Hezbollah firing rockets
from Lebanon, and ballistic missiles fired from Iran, would destroy Israel. Or
something like that. This basic Hamas strategy is based largely on faith, not
reality. But Hamas is a faith based organization, where the ends are not in
dispute, only the means of getting there. Thus the Hamas "radicals"
believe that fighting Israel, no matter what the odds or losses, is the way to
go. The Hamas "moderates" believe in waiting until sufficient
armaments and armed manpower is available, in order to do the most damage to
Israel, with the best chance of victory. Most of the moderates are with the
exiled Hamas leaders living in Syria, plus a few living in Gaza. Nearly all the
radicals are in Gaza, and they are seeking a bloody confrontation with Israel.
Hamas as over 20,000 armed men in Gaza. Most
of these are not well trained or led, and would be slaughtered by an invading
Israeli ground force. But the Israelis would also suffer casualties and, most
importantly for Hamas, there would be lots of civilian casualties. These would
be played as innocent victims of Israeli war crimes. What Hamas does not put
across in this English language media effort is their doctrine (only expressed
in Arabic) of "involuntary martyrdom." In other words, civilians play
a big role in defeating Israel by getting caught in the middle of the fighting
and becoming dead bodies or maimed victims. Most Palestinian civilians seek to
avoid this involuntary martyrdom, but Hamas gets around that by deliberately
placing their facilities in residential neighborhoods, and preventing civilians
from fleeing into Egypt.
While the media likes to play up pro-Hamas
demonstrations in the Arab world, the Arab media, and public opinion, is quite
hostile to Hamas. Not just because of the reckless and bloody minded Hamas
tactics, but also because Hamas is seen as an Iranian ally. Arab governments,
in particular, are wary of Iranian motives. Arabs in general have grown
impatient with Palestinian ineptitude. No one (especially in the Arab world)
wants to openly admit that the Israelis have made a real effort to negotiate a
peace deal, but dumping on the Palestinians for negotiating in bad faith is no
longer something only done in private.
Israel doesn't really want to send in ground
troops, but it will take some kind of miracle to avoid that. Meanwhile, the
Israeli army had been developing new tactics and weapons for an urban battle in
Gaza. This has been kept quiet. Oh, Hamas knows about it, as there has been
mention in the Israeli media about the new training centers, new tactics, and
some of the soldiers will talk (even though ordered, for their own safety in a
future conflict, to keep quiet.) But Hamas does not know the details, and that
it where it is likely to get messy for them. Israel is intent on inflicting
maximum casualties on Hamas, with minimal losses for the Israelis and
Palestinian civilians. Thus the Israeli ground operation will be full of
surprises, and casualties.
Another big unknown is how effective Fatah
will be in restoring order in Gaza. This will all be stage managed, with Fatah
"reluctantly" returning to govern what's left of Gaza. There will be
a lot of Arab-on-Arab violence. But there has already been a lot of that in
Gaza, and many Gazans are eager for an opportunity to go after Hamas.
When it's all over in a few months, Gaza
will still be full of young Palestinian men willing to kill Israelis, and
Palestinians who disagree with terrorism. The Palestinian media, clerics and
educators will still be pushing a "destroy Israel" agenda. But as far
as the Israelis are concerned, if the rockets are no longer landing in Israel,
the campaign will be a success.
INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS: Students Speaking In Tongues
January 1, 2009: The U.S. Army has come up
with yet another way to obtain more military personnel who can speak foreign
languages. ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) students will receive an
additional $100-250 a month if they study and learn a foreign language the
military needs (mostly Arabic, Chinese and those spoken in Afghanistan). ROTC
students attend hundreds of colleges in the United States, and have most of
their college expenses paid for (including up to $500 a month for living
expenses) if they graduate and successfully complete their ROTC studies (and
then serve for up to four years on active duty.) The army gets about 55 percent
of its officers via ROTC programs. Many students are eager to learn Arabic or
Chinese, as these languages can enhance ones civilian career. More money is
paid for students learning Dari and Pushtun (the languages spoken in
Afghanistan, the poorest country in Asia.)
Although the U.S. military has about 17,000
troops who speak languages like Arabic, Chinese, Farsi (Iran), Urdu (Pakistan),
Hindi, and Korean, there simply aren't enough for operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In addition to the new ROTC program, the Department of Defense has established the
Civilian Linguist Reserve. Those who qualify (in terms of skills, and ability
to get a security clearance) are paid a monthly fee to be available, in an
emergency, to come work for the military. The Pentagon found a lot of American
Arabic speakers during the Iraq war, because these civilians went to work for
contractors, or directly for the government, to provide translation services in
the United States and Iraq. Many of these interpreters are already qualified
for the Civilian Linguist Reserve.
Even though it's easy enough to hire locals
as translators, there are shortcomings to that approach. It didn't take U.S.
troops long to realize that the most dangerous intelligence job in Iraq was
that of interpreter. Another way to get Arabic interpreters is to hire them
from other Arab nations. The money is attractive, and many linguists in nearby
Arab nations have learned the Iraqi dialect in order to get these jobs. There
is also a feeling that Iraq will soon present many economic opportunities,
providing less dangerous work for non-Iraqis who understand the Iraqi dialect.
Some Arabic speaking Americans, after one tour in Iraq, have comes back to help
with screening English speaking Arabs applying for interpreters. To attract the
needed number of interpreters, many of the supervisory and screening personnel
are hired via contractors. That way, these people, who are in short supply, can
be offered enough money to induce them to take on this work.
The Department of Defense can get enough
interpreters for Iraq and Afghanistan operations, but only by hiring a lot of
foreigners. This is risky from a security point of view. Terrorist groups, and
hostile governments, can get to these foreign interpreters eventually, and find
out a lot about American intelligence techniques. This is a long term price to
pay, in order to deal with the short term interpreter shortage. Thus having
more American officers who speak these languages is a major advantage on the
battlefield.