September 30, 2024:
India continues its effort to design and build SSN (nuclear attack sub) submarines. Construction is supposed to begin this year with the first SSNs entering service in 2032.
India is currently building six locally designed SSBN (nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles). India is one of only six nations that build nuclear submarines. The United States was first, putting its first nuclear sub into service during 1954. Russia followed in 1958, followed by Britain in 1963, France in 1971, China in 1983 and India in 2016. The United States always had the largest number of reliable nuclear attack and ballistic missile carrying submarines. The Soviet Union put more nuclear subs into service, but these boats were less reliable and dangerous for their crews because of radiation leaks. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, one of its legacies was that most of its 240 nuclear submarines were worthless. Most were poorly designed and built and more dangerous to their crews than to their enemies. NATO nations are still assisting Russia to decommission these submarines and their 468 nuclear reactors. Most subs had two reactors. NATO nations are assisting Russia in this cleanup, to prevent any of those reactors and their nuclear material from ending up on the sea bottom emitting harmful radiation for hundreds of years. While the Americans, British, French, Chinese and Indians operated and disposed of their retired nuclear subs safely, Russia did not.
India learned how to operate nuclear subs by leasing two of them from Russia. The first was in 1988 when India received the Russian K-43 attack submarine. Russia imposed restrictions on how India could use this sub and India returned it in 1990. In 2010 India leased a more advanced Akula class nuclear submarine but returned it in 2021 because of chronic and crippling maintenance problems.
India had leased those two Russian subs to train their crews so there were Indian sailors capable of operating. In the 1980s India decided to build its own nuclear-powered submarines. This was a slow process. The first Indian ballistic missile nuclear sub was the Arihant, which entered service in 2018 after fourteen years of effort building it and getting the boat to function effectively. Indian Admirals pointed out that Arihant was a demonstration project and successfully went to sea in 2018 on its first patrol, armed with ballistic missiles.
India began working on a SSN in the late 1980s but, as work progressed, it was decided to enlarge SSN design by adding a ballistic missile compartment and put all their efforts into creating an SSBN. This was a tried and true solution. Russia and China had successfully done this, following the example of the United States in the 1950s.
The first American SSBNs were the five 6,000 ton boats of the George Washington class. These were basically Skipjack class SSNs that were enlarged to add a missile compartment for 16 Polaris missiles. The 3,000 ton Skipjacks were designed in the early 1950s and construction of the first one began in 1956 and entered service in 1959. The U.S. Navy literally modified the hulls of two Skipjack SSNs under construction to accommodate the missile compartment and other less drastic changes. Thus the construction of the first American SSBN began in 1957, was launched in June 1959 and entered service at the end of 1959. Four more followed and by March 1961 five of these SSBNs were in service. They all served into the 1980s. The first American SSBN class was followed by five of the 6,900 ton Ethan Allen class, which was designed from the start as an SSBN. The first of these began construction in late 1959 and entered service in August 1961. Four more followed by January 1963. Note that the first American SSN (the Nautilus) began construction in 1952 and entered service in 1955. So the U.S. Navy went from SSN to SSBN in four years.
The Indian Navy took longer to get it done because the Indian weapons development and procurement bureaucracy is infamous for its ability to disrupt and delay weapons development programs. Arihant is still not fully in service. Meanwhile a second Arihant class SSBN, the Arighaat entered service in 2024.
Arihant entered service in 2018 and carried out its first combat cruise with nuclear armed missiles. In 2022 Arihant launched one of its missiles which accurately hit its target area in the Bay of Bengal. Both Indian SSBNs are currently in service with more on the way.
In 2016 India successfully tested its new K4 SLBM (Sea Launched Ballistic Missile) under realistic conditions. This consisted of a submerged silo (like the one used in a submarine) that successfully released the missile at a realistic depth. The missile reached the surface, ignited its rocket motor and completed its ballistic flight as it was designed to do. Several more successful tests like this are required before K4 can enter service. K4 is based on the Agni 3 land based ballistic missile, which has been in service since 2010. Both the Agni 3 and K4 have a range of 3,500 kilometers. K4 is a 20 ton, two stage, solid fuel missile that carries a one ton warhead.
Arihant was built to carry nuclear armed K4 or K15 ballistic missiles designed and manufactured in India. Arihant has four vertical launch tubes, which can carry twelve, three per launch tube, of the smaller K15 missiles or four larger K-4s. The Arihant is based on the Russian Charlie II sub, which it resembles. The Charlie class had eight launch tubes, outside the pressure hull, for anti-ship missiles. Arihant has a crew of 90-100 and six 533mm torpedo tubes in addition to the four vertical missile launch tubes.
In early 2013 the K15 missile underwent its final development test and was ready to be installed in the Arihant. This came after five years of testing and tweaking. In 2007, India announced that it had perfected the technology for launching ballistic missiles from a submerged submarine. That meant the silo design had been perfected as well. In 2008, India began a series of twelve test firings from a missile cell designed to fit into the Arihant. These test firings were not done from the Arihant, but from the cell placed in the ground or underwater to simulate launch from the sub. Seven launches took place in 2008.
The seven ton K15 has a 700 kilometer range with a one ton warhead or 1,900 kilometers with a 189 kg warhead. The latter weight is sufficient to handle a nuclear warhead if India has been successful in developing warhead technology to the same point the U.S. and Russia were in the 1980s.
The first SLBM was the U.S. Polaris A1, which entered service in 1961 after about five years of development. Like the K15 it was a two stage solid fuel missile. The Polaris A1 weighed 13 tons, had a range of 2,200 kilometers and a one ton warhead.
There are apparently problems with the readiness of the nuclear warheads used in the Arihant SSBNs. This has to do with security and controls over who has launch authority.
Since 1999 India has been seeking to build 24 modern diesel-electric submarines. India elected a new reform-minded government in 2014 that was obsessed with making India less dependent on imported military technology. Increased efforts to develop domestic weapons development and production capability have failed. In response to this the government made it more difficult to import needed weapons that Indian firms were unable to develop and build. India is also trying to reduce the power of government weapons development and production operations that have never been able to do much of anything, let alone compete with foreign defense manufacturers.
The major goals of local procurement are to decrease reliance on Russia, which was, until recently, India’s largest supplier of military equipment. For a long time India was the second largest, after Saudi Arabia, importer of weapons in the world and the largest customer for Russian military exports. India has been buying less from Russia since the 1990s. Since the 1960s Russia supplied more and more, often over 80 percent, of Indian weapons imports. In the last decade that has fallen to fifty percent and continues to decline.
The second part of the program to reduce weapons imports is to make it easier for Indian firms to meet the needs of the Indian military. The government issued a list identifying specific weapons and items of military equipment that must be procured locally. Making it mandatory to buy locally has been tried before and led to some spectacular failures, so much so that the government authorized the emergency FTP (Fast Track Procurement) procedures in 2004. With FTP the military could unilaterally buy some items from foreign suppliers. It was assumed that FTP would eliminate the most embarrassing problems with getting desperately needed military weapons. It was also believed that government efforts to clean up the corruption and other problems with the military procurement process would soon make FTP unnecessary. That has not happened.
FTP is still around to allow the immediate purchase of essential military items without the usual political and procurement delays that can add years, sometimes a decade or more, to obtaining needed items. FTP is still needed because the current confrontation with better equipped Chinese forces on the northern border makes it obvious that all the Chinese weapons and equipment is Chinese-made and clearly more modern. Recent Made in India mandates make it more difficult to use FTP. The Indian Air Force believes it will not be able to replace aging jet fighters with local designs in time. The air force will shrink while the politicians come up with more ways to block efforts to fix the problem. This refusal to face reality and actually solve procurement problems has crippled the Indian military for decades.
Meanwhile Indians ask why China developed a world-class weapons development and production capability in the last few decades while India has not? Mainly it’s about corruption and decades of India making it difficult for Indians to start and operate profitable firms that could produce consumer goods as well as military equipment. The United States became the largest economy in the world over a century ago by encouraging this entrepreneurship. Many other nations, including those in Europe and East Asia like Japan, South Korea and China followed that example.
While making it difficult for Indian entrepreneurs, India tried to use government-owned weapons development efforts and defense manufacturers to locally produce weapons. These state-owned organizations were epic failures and continue to develop second-rate weapons or weapons that don’t work at all. Recent examples include assault rifles, helicopters and jet fighters. The only successes have been with privately owned firms and that is what the government wants more of. New rules and laws to reduce restrictions on commercial firms are meant to encourage less dependence on imports. As with previous efforts in this area, the goals tend to be more aspirational than actual. Indian government bureaucrats and procurement agencies have become quite effective at protecting their own interests at the expense of commercial firms and the needs of the military.
This is a problem in all industrialized nations because that is the nature of government; to use their power to expand. Nations like China and Israel are notably different because China did not begin undergoing the industrial revolution until the 1980s. As usual, that produced spectacular results, which will be eroded over the years as the government expands at the expense of successful new firms. That is already happening in China, where the communist government fears the potential political influence of the largest and most successful firms. Israel is a special case because they have been under constant attack by their Moslem neighbors since Israel was founded in 1947. For Israel it has always been a matter of succeeding at developing new weapons or being wiped out.
India is different because it adopted a local form of socialism instead of free enterprise when modern India was formed in 1948. As a result, India has always had to import most of its weapons. Efforts to change this have failed so far, mainly because of corruption and unwillingness to tolerate competitive and efficient defense industries. That corruption that has been pervasive in India for thousands of years and makes imported weapons from nations willing to pay bribes to Indian government officials more attractive than allowing competitive Indian firms to develop and provide cheaper locally made equipment.
One bit of good news is that this form of corruption has been under heavy attack for more than a decade because of the Internet. Political parties could control mass media and much local news, but not the Internet. Fighting corruption has become enormously popular with voters, who learn that most Western countries supplying weapons to India are often very anti-corruption themselves and much more successful at it. When Russia was supplying over 80 percent of weapons imports, you had a supplier that was a dictatorship and quite comfortable with bribes and payoffs. For more than a decade Russia has been losing sales to Western firms. The culture of corruption still exists in Indian defense procurement, but it is under heavy attack. Even if no bribes were involved when buying foreign weapons, that would not fix the inability to create a competitive Indian weapons industry.
The reason for that has to do with why, for most of the last half century, most Indian weapons came from Russia. There were several reasons for that: politics, price and practicality. The policy was a decision by Indian politicians to be non-aligned during the Cold War. This conflict began just as India became independent from the British Empire. Still resentful towards Britain and the West for two centuries of colonial domination, India officially refused to take sides during the Cold War. Yet its relations with Russia, a communist dictatorship, were much warmer than with the Western democracies. Although India clung to democracy, the educated classes were infatuated with the promise of socialism. For several decades Indians abhorred the Russian form of government which was a dictatorship but admired their socialist approach to running their economy. It wasn’t until the 1980s that most Indian politicians admitted that the Russian economic model was all a fraud and not working. For India, this set-in motion the sort of free enterprise policies that China had employed since the 1980s. By then it was too late for India. Decades of attempts to impose government regulation and guidance of the economy had created a huge bureaucracy that could not be easily dismantled because many of these jobs were used by politicians to reward supporters and get reelected.
Then there was the price of Russian weapons. They were cheaper than Western equivalents. This meant more could be spent on bribes and payoffs. Finally, there was practicality. India’s main foes were Pakistan and China. Pakistan had a much smaller population, economy and defense budget than India. Russian weapons were adequate for Pakistan. China was also poorly equipped until quite recently, and separated from India by the Himalaya Mountains. Under those conditions Russian weapons were just fine for Indian needs.
Since the Cold War ended in 1991 all this has changed. Indian politics has changed and now officially wants to clamp down on the corruption, which everyone admits cripples the economy. Price is still important, but it’s been noticed that Russian weapons have slipped in quality and effectiveness since the Soviet Union collapsed. Pakistan is even less of a military threat, because Pakistan is even more corrupt and economically crippled than India. China, however, is another matter. China has managed to build a powerful and productive arms industry. All those Russian weapons India has no longer provides any degree of superiority. India needs Western-quality arms to maintain a competitive military for confronting China, but those are more expensive. It’s possible to make them in India under license, but the Indian industry has not been able to master high tech sufficiently to make this practical. In short, it’s no longer practical to tolerate an inefficient domestic defense industry.
Efforts to create domestic defense industries have been crippled by specific portions of the bureaucracy. The worst of these is the DRDO (Defense Research and Development Organization). Alas, DRDO became a monumental example of bureaucratic inefficiency, wasting billions of dollars and decades of effort on weapons systems that never quite became operational or when they did, they really weren't. DRDO was created in 1958 to provide government support and guidance for defense related research. But the network of research and manufacturing facilities DRDO established since then were more about patronage and plundering the taxpayers than in actually creating competitive defense industries. Even DRDO efforts to create low-tech weapons like assault rifles and other infantry equipment were failures, with sloppiness and inefficiency resulting in very uncompetitive weapons.
Worse, many major DRDO weapons development projects have failed because bad politics ensured that bad ideas kept getting funded, and those efforts rarely produced anything the military found acceptable. For example, the 5.5-ton Dhruv helicopter was in development for two decades before the first one was delivered in 2002. Since then, domestic and foreign users have expressed dissatisfaction. A series of crashes indicated some basic design flaws, which the manufacturer insisted did not exist. Similar situation with locally developed Tejas jet fighter. Indian politicians still cite these two aircraft as examples of successful Indian developed tech. The Indian military has been equally quick to cite these two aircraft as unacceptable and has often succeeded in avoiding accepting more than a token number. Export customers did not exist.
Then there is the effort to develop and build a tank. Many of the problems with the Arjun tank project had to do with nothing more than government ineptitude. The Ministry of Defense was more interested in putting out press releases about how India was becoming self-sufficient in tanks than in attending to the technical details needed to make this happen. The Ministry of Defense crowd has done this sort of thing many times. Moreover, if it isn't incompetence screwing things up, then it's corruption.
Efforts to develop missile systems have also been a long running failure. Work on indigenous missile designs, under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), managed by DRDO has gone on for decades, with no useful weapons to show for it. The most common problems were apparently caused by inept software development. While India has a lot of local talent in this department, creating this kind of specialized military software is very difficult and the best programmers tend to join the growing number of new companies that sell their services or software products to foreigners. Many other Indian engineers and scientists migrate to countries where it is easier to put their skills to good use.
The one exception has been ballistic missiles. Curiously this was seen as a really, really important project and the politicians eventually backed off and let the engineers get on with it. India has world class engineers and scientists, but too many of them have to go overseas to do what they do best because the government does not tolerate being told what works and what doesn’t by people who know what they are talking about.
India is determined to develop the capability of designing and building high-tech weapons, something few countries can do. India is following in the footsteps of China and Russia, two nations that still have most of their population living in poverty, while the state concentrated resources to create the technological base needed to build modern weapons. Russia and China have gone farther than India in developing and manufacturing modern weapons. Not as far as Western firms, if only because of the corruption and lawlessness in both those nations. But Russia and China had an advantage of having authoritarian governments. Decisions could get made quickly and decisively. India is a democracy and democracies are messy. Important decisions tend to get “kicked down the road” rather than taken care of. Chinese leaders openly boast of this as a major reason China has succeeded while India fails.
There have been some new ideas and opportunities. One of the most alluring is the growing number of private firms in India that can handle defense work. Currently non-government Indian firms get about a quarter of the contracts. Foreign defense firms can make deals with these private firms who can then go after Indian defense contracts. But standing in the way are the Indian defense officials. The Indian bureaucrats have a well-deserved reputation of gumming up the works and preventing needful things from getting done. This makes it difficult for private companies, especially when the main customer is the government. Getting rid of DRDO and its 30,000 employees is difficult. Over 20 percent of them are scientists and engineers unable to compete in a free market economy with many of the rest are obstructionist bureaucrats that cripple the efforts of commercial firms competing with DRDO. Eliminating DRDO is extremely unpopular with most politicians. Yet in the last few years senior elected officials have made some decisive moves to end the bureaucratic deadlock. This involved something as simple as ending the ban on former military personnel taking key jobs in the Defense Ministry and shutting down state-owned arms factories with long records of failure.
This situation is tragic and a growing number of Indians realize it. India, a regional superpower and the world’s largest democracy, with a population of over a billion, now finds itself in a very rough neighborhood and military efficiency is becoming a necessity, not just a worthy goal. To deal with that, India has always maintained large armed forces and one of the largest armies, with a million troops. But keeping these troops equipped, as is expected of them, has proved to be very difficult. The army keeps falling behind in replacing aging weapons like artillery and obtaining new technology like missiles, smart munitions, and night vision. Getting the money from the government has been the least of their problems. The biggest hassles are with corruption and failed efforts to develop local weapons production.
The latest government moves to change all that are not revolutionary, but evolutionary. As has long been observed, democracies always do the right thing, but often only after trying everything else. India still has not reached the end of the everything else list. For the DRDO this moment arrived in 2024 when the government implemented a number of long overdue reforms. DRDO is losing many of its current staff and forced to concentrate more on efficiency and effectiveness.