October 2,2008:
Banditry has always been a big
problem in Afghanistan. There has never been an effective national police
force, and army operations merely caused the bandits to scatter back to their
villages. The basic problem is that there is not one Afghanistan, but hundreds.
Each tribe and warlord has its own army which polices its neighborhood.
Everything outside that area is considered potentially hostile territory. Men are
free to go outside the tribal area and become bandits. Loot taken in battle (or
armed robbery) has always been a big deal in Pushtun tribal culture. So while
most Afghans can understand the usefulness of keeping the main road from Kabul
to Kandahar open, many of those same Afghans condone their kinsmen robbing
people on that highway, as long as it's done to "strangers" (not from
our tribe or, even better, foreigners.) While a lot of Afghans, especially
those living in urban areas, try to get away from these medieval attitudes, the
majority of those in the countryside are more traditional in their attitudes.
This is where a lot of the violence comes from. Journalists tend to blame it
all on the "Taliban," but in fact, most of it is just those gun
totting country boys doing what they've always done. More are on the payroll of
some drug gang, than a Taliban outfit. Life would be so much easier, so the
conventional wisdom goes, if peace could
be obtained by just destroying the "Taliban." But the real enemy is a
set of cultural attitudes that aid and abet the lawlessness. It's a much more
elusive target.
Cities like
Kabul have become very different parts of Afghanistan. You see lots of women
without veils (even as Western media report "Taliban terror creeping into
Kabul"), and men without beards. Videos and music are freely available, as
are alcoholic drinks. A lot of these city slickers are fresh from the country,
where the restrictive lifestyle of "tradition" continues to drive the
more adventurous away. This is the sort of thing that offends tribal and
religious leaders. These guys don't want change, because it tends to mean less
power and money for them. That's why the Taliban has such a following in the
countryside, and not in the cities.
News reports
about Pakistani troops exchanging fire with NATO and U.S. helicopters at the
border appear to be more stories than news. Many of the border guards (a force
recruited from local tribes) are pro-Taliban (or on the Taliban payroll), and
quick to fire on aircraft and any armed men they are not familiar with. That's
been going on for decades, and was the cause of tension with the Russians in
the 1980s. Real violence between Pakistan and the United States is unlikely,
because the U.S. is the major financial and military supplier for Pakistan. Thus
without U.S. support, military upgrades don't happen and the economy tanks.
Religion is one thing, defense and economics are something else (that is more
important to more Pakistanis). Meanwhile, the government makes the right noises
about "defending Pakistan's borders" while doing nothing to actually
interfere with American operations on either side of the border.
Over 20,000
Pushtuns have fled from Pakistan into Afghanistan to avoid the violence between
Taliban gunmen and the Pakistani army. The Pakistani Taliban are under attack
in several areas (Waziristan, Swat Valley and Bajaur) and losing in all of
them. The head of the Pakistani Taliban has just died, after being ill for
several months, leaving behind a power struggle. The Pakistani Taliban is in
disarray and falling apart. This is being felt in Afghanistan, where fewer
"volunteers" are coming across to help out the Taliban there. In the
face of this, the Afghan Taliban say they will keep fighting throughout the
Winter. NATO responds by announcing another Winter offensive. This will get
interesting, because NATO forces are more mobile in Winter. Traditionally,
Afghans stay indoors during the Winter. Getting a chill can be fatal, and the
rain, snow and ice make it difficult to get around.
The
government has again openly called for Taliban leader Mullah Omar to come
negotiate with the government. This comes in the wake of several years worth of
successful negotiations with lower level Taliban leaders. Many of these guys
have left the Taliban as a result. There are also reports, denied by the
government, that Saudi Arabia is sponsoring secret peace talks between the
government and the Taliban. One has to ask, why would the Taliban want to
negotiate? Put simply, while the drug gangs are doing well (despite heroin
production falling 20 percent from last year), the Taliban are on everyone's
hit list, and are taking a lot of hits. Now defeated al Qaeda operatives are
moving in from Iraq and elsewhere, and blowing people up. That generates more
hostility than support, and this hurts the Taliban as well. Within the Taliban,
a debate is on over how to deal with the lack of progress. The Taliban have
been able to generate more violence, and dire headlines in the West, but not
much else. True believers are getting discouraged.
U.S. and
NATO commanders believe they can largely shut down the Taliban and al Qaeda if
they have some more troops. The U.S. has agreed to send three more brigades
next year. NATO nations, urged on by France, are trying to muster more troops
for Afghanistan. By next year, changes in Pakistan, and growing attacks on
Afghan drug gangs are expected to weaken the Taliban even more. The new
government in Pakistan is behind the recent army offensives against the
Taliban, and has just replaced the head of their intelligence agency, the ISI,
which originally invented the Taliban back in the 1990s. The ISI has long been
full of Islamic conservatives, but the new head is different. How different
will become apparent by early next year.
September
30, 2008: The Taliban hampered recent
polio vaccinations, despite promises that they would not. This hurt a
world-wide effort to eliminate polio completely. This campaign has been
hampered in several parts of the world by paranoid Islamic clerics, who believe
the vaccinations are part of a Western campaign to poison Moslems.
September
28, 2008: In Kandahar, a Taliban death
squad killed the head of the local police forces female squad. Lieutenant
Colonel Malalai Kakar was the most senior female police officer in the country,
and long a target of the Taliban (who do not want women working outside the
home, and definitely not working as a cop). Colonel Kakar pioneered the use of
women police as detectives, who were very successful because of their ability
to get information from women witnesses and victims. The Taliban didn't like
that either.